


# The Real Estate ANALYST


NOVEMBER

Roy Wenzlick Editor

A concise easily digested monthly analysis based upon scientific research in real estate fundamentals and trends...Constantly measuring and reporting the basic economic factors responsible for changes in trends and values...Current Studies...Surveys...Forecasts

Copyright 1937 by REAL ESTATE ANALYSTS, Inc. — Saint Louis
Real Estate Economists, Appraisers and Counselors






HE chart above shows the fluctuations of urban real estate activity, foreclosures, and rents in the United States from 1870 to the present. The chart to the left is the last five years of the upper chart enlarged to show monthly fluctuations. This chart is explained in detail in the article starting on page 632 in the November issue.

The national average of real estate sales continued to decline for the fifth successive month during October. This is not at all surprising as all indexes of general business have been declining at a record rate following the drop in the securities market. During a period in which the future is uncertain the average individual postpones the purchase of real estate. It is quite surprising that the drop has not been more rapid than shown on our chart.

It is quite remarkable that in spite of the tremendous drop in the securities market, the increase in unemployment and the drop in production, our rent index has continued to climb and our foreclosure index has continued to drop. Rents have now reached the highest point in the recovery, and foreclosures have reached the lowest point since 1929.

While the recession which is now in progress has had an unprecedented severity, considering the duration, we are still in-

clined to believe that it represents a marked recession rather than a major depression. If the present rate of decrease continues, however, it will assume the proportions of the 1920 and 1921 collapse. The encouraging thing in connection with this collapse, however, is the relatively slight effect on real estate improvement.



# DWELLING UNIT ZO S RENTAL ADVERTISED

RAL Estate Analysts, Inc., computes the average advertised ent of single femily desiling and heated apartment units sach month in the trenty-aix metropolitan areas listed below. The figures given are average rents parameth per room for all units of each type, large and small, advertised in the classified columns of the leading newspare of each oity. The figures given below, unlike the figures with appeared in earlier issues of The Real Estate Analyst, have been adjusted for seasonal fluctuation, as we

have found some regular seasonal fluctuation in our advertised rental prices.

The average rent per month per room of all places' the included with any considerably from month to month due to the includen some months of a larger number of either high or low priced units. The charts on the opposite page show these figures adjusted for seasons fluctuation, city by city, with large composite charts showing the average fluctuations.

in principal cities. Advertised rents represent not what prop-erids are actually resting for, but whet has causes of the properties believe they will bring. After some adjustment in periods of depression for bargaining between the landlord and the tenant and for other concessions, we are convinced that those rents represent roughly the levels at which properties are being rented currently. The last figures are preliminary, based on the advertisements appearing during the first two

111

	_							_						
	1	*Nov. 89.5	2095 11.050 10.00	900.11	75.97	13.79	98.88	9.99	10.95 12.57 12.88	12.55	15.15	10.52	25034 12141	strike
		98.0 88.0	10,000	10.664	223.88	25.50 26.50	8299945	9.99	13.15	12.61	11.02	19.60 10.75 15.41 14.04	24826	8
		3ept 86.5	8.52 8.52 8.52 11.00	10.68 10.62 8.74 7.82 11.28	79915	13.03	67.25.26.7	66.5	13.50	133.25	11.60	19.38 110.15 114.85 13.89	15145 15537	хИотврар
		86.0 86.0	10.65	10.48 8.99 7.96 11.23	25.11.00	13.45 13.45 10.52	8.59	5.99	12.50	123.52	11.55	8.65 10.37 14.91 13.05	10010	
		3414 86.8	7.33	10.60 8.60 7.93	9.15	10.55	87.54	67.1	10.32 10.56 9.54 13.20	13.62	13,5211	9.07 10.50 14.92 13.30	10.16	r.y
	937	June 87.0	20093	11.18 8.65 8.65 8.02 11.34	7.98	525.03	88.30 7.50 8.45 8.45 8.45 8.45 8.45 8.45 8.45 8.45	4.59	10.36	13.22	13.26	8.95 20.22 10.05 13.28	10.05	liminary
	Ī	May 86.1	10.558 10.558 10.558	11.29 10.40 8 54 10.57	455.60	946998	8 50 3 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	0.49	10.62 8.83 13.68	127.568	12.08	100 FEB 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22	10.82	*Pre
		Apr. 83.9	65.25	28886	785.20	20000	200000 20000 20000 20000 20000	61.5	123.39	12.92 112.08 112.08 11.69	11.08	919.19	10.72	
		Mar. 82.0	75.55	988888	22225	53225	8852558	61.0	22,000	583	12.551	119.00	22.88.23	
		Feb.	94674 84676 84676	10.12 7.86 9.95 9.95	6.8155	97.29	70077	6.09	13.27 113.27	12.12	13.17	7.90 11.01 15.64	10.38	
		Jan. 78.9	925.09	997-69	8.52 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.2	122.81	46867 108884	1.09	9.45 8.95 13.20	12.20	10.50	88.51 12.55 9.95 9.95 9.95	10.29	
	1	Dec. 78.9	\$3.25.6 55.55.55	347.63	8.51.09	45.55 8.85 8.85 8.51 8.51 8.51	25555	1.09	9.36 12.53 12.03	111.38	9.13	25.54 45.55 45.55	10:00	
		Nov. 77.1	66.18 6.18 10.75 11.05 1	85505E	04086 24088	12.78 6.12 8.49	7.×32.58	58.0	10.04 8.59 12.59	1110101	10.95 8.95 8.95 8.95	9.95 9.95	100.00	
		74.9	9.25.85	99.55	8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	86665	7.x.50 8.52 7.x.50 7.x.50 7.x.50 7.x.50 7.x.50	57.9	10.13 8.95 11.95 11.95	10.98	99.22.29	118.28 10.30 13.87	1900 T	
		3ept.	500000 80000 80000 80000	20000 20000 2000	8 20800 408 48 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	86662	7.× 7 80.08 81.8 7.× 7	58.4	10.26 10.26 11.85 11.82	12.57	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000	8.15.01 13.27 13.11	10.30 19.79 11.30	
		Aug.	2020.00	66699	8 20 8 8 8 20 8 8 8 20 20 8	86.50	6.84 6.11 7.70 7.52	58.5	10.35 10.50 11.80	112.40	995323	8 57 10 32 10 15	10.41 9.74 x	
	36	72.0	-22.20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2	866689	20000	6.37	38515	59.1	10.20	111.00	25554	8.54 10.38 12.85 9.99	10,000	
	0	June 71.7	-2000 -20192	86668	50000	5.50	1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00	58.0	10.34	10.65	9974.00	8.025 20.03 20.03 20.03 20.03	56.5	2
		かった	**************************************	88668	5001000	5.55	200000	58.0	10.45 8.55 12.20	10.59	899796 58749	8.37 10.10 12.82 10.03	99.83	1
		Apr. 70.9	\$75.50 \$75.00 \$10.80 \$10.00 \$1	867.88	500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500	3355	123280	57.5	10.31 8.53 11.53	11.69 10.40 10.72 10.61	25.25.	8.571 10.577 10.085	20011	
		Mar. 69.8	52000	8857.88 505.60	50000 50000 50000 50000	25.52	86.00 cc	57.6	11.23	10.15	92.026	925.55	10.01	
		Feb.	2007.0 2009.0	885248	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 200	55.70	880 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80	57.3	10.20	10.38	89.0312	8.49 17.56 19.10 13.10	895.45	4
		Jan. 68.9	50000 80000 80000 80000			25.55	82.83.27 82.83.27 82.83.27	56.9	1128211	10.10	8.00 9.88 9.88 9.00		22221	5000
	1	Dec.	\$ 1000 0 3400 0 3400 0	000000	54888 5454 5454	25.45.8 86.45.8	0000000 0100000 0100000	57.3	10.26 11.55 12.08 11.43	10.83 10.35 10.35	6.86 11.69 8.73	85056	896	4
		Nov. 68.3	-00		5-3888 0-38548	5-4	4860000	56.3	11.59	10.86 8.72 10.43	16.73	8.28 17.60 13.11	20001	20.04
	5	0ct.	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 200			5.45.60 8.385.60		56.1	11.38			13.00	200010	40.70
	193	Sept. 67.5	9.55.09	LLmno		577.30		55.8	11.03	100.25	7.86 10.27 8.86 8.86	17.80	99991	10.64
		Aug. 66.6	97.598		589 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50	~		55.5	04011	100.001	10.03	13.85	96.61	3
		July 66.2	87.57.9 21.99.15			460.65		55.3	94. 14.	10.05	7.48888			
	L	June 67.1	36.7.0 1.00.1 1.00.1	54.08 54.08 54.08 54.08	680 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 8	23.50	1010 IU L-IU 10	. 10	9.33	99.86	3.28 10.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1	13.27	40000	70
		Index		4	lts les	ens phia gh	uis claco	Index		44 41	ity Less Lis		uis City cisco	
		Wational	Atlanta Baltimore Birmingham Boston Chicago	Cincinnati Cleveland Columbus Denver Detroit	Houston Kansas City Los Angeles Milwaukee	New Orleans New York Omaha Philadelphia	Richmond Saint Louis Sait Lake City San Francisco Seattle Tulsa	Wational	Atlanta Baltimore Birmingham Boston Chicago	Cincinnati Cleveland Columbus Denver Detroit	Houston Kansas City Los Angeles Milwaukee	New Orleans New York Omaha. Philadelphia.	Richmond Saint Louis Sait Lake City San Francisco 1	September
				NETTING			NIS					A DETA		


# COMPARISON OF ADVERTISED RENTS


ACH advertisement of a place for rent appearing in the newspapers of the principal cities of the United States is carefully studied, and from this Real Estate Analysts, Inc., computes for each major city the average advertised rent per month per room. Advertised rent is not actual rent, but it indicates what owners of property believe they can get for the units then vacant. Sometimes they become too optimistic; and as the renting season progresses without their vacancies filling, they become panicky and drop the advertised rent below the market.

We believe that in many ways advertised rents are a forecast of actual rents, that they go up faster than actual rents and that they drop more rapidly during a period of depression.

The chart below shows advertised rents in Saint Louis for single family dwellings, comparing the period preceding the last boom and the boom itself with the period from 1925 to the present. A similar chart which we have prepared on apartment rents does not show as large an increase in the last few years as we have charted here, due to the fact that apartment vacancy in Saint Louis is still larger than vacancy in single family dwellings and duplexes.

The very satisfactory movement of this single family advertised rent line, however, would indicate to us that after a recession in advertised rents, which will develop during the next few months, there is a strong probability that the advertised rent line will again advance until it exceeds the level of the last boom. We would not be surprised, however, to see a recession in our advertised rent line during the next six to nine months somewhat similar to the recession of 1921 and the early part of 1922.







## THE STOCK MARKET AND REAL ESTATE


Jones industrial and railroad stock price averages for the entire period for which they are available in comparison with the fluctuations in general business as charted by Colonel Ayres of the Cleveland Trust Company and the real estate cycle as charted by Real Estate Analysts, Inc. The number of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange on a per capita basis is shown by the red line crossing the general business cycle chart. The foreclosure rate and the volume of new building are shown by the lines superimposed on the real estate activity chart. The red vertical stippled bands A to F crossing the chart designate the months in which the Dow-Jones industrial average was falling by a large enough percentage or for a long enough period to equal or exceed the fall we have had in this average since this last spring. These stippled bands make it quite easy to compare these bear market periods with general business conditions and real estate.

We believe that the following deductions seem more or less self-evident:

- l. Each of these bear markets has been accompanied and followed by a marked recession in general business.
- 2. Each of the bear markets, with but one exception (band A), has been accompanied by declining real estate activity.
- 3. Each of these bear markets, with but one exception (band D), has been accompanied by declining building volume.
- 4. Three of these bear markets (A,D,F) have been periods of falling foreclosures and three have been periods of rising foreclosures (B,C,E).
- 5. Three of the periods have occurred when the basic idealized capital goods cycle (shown by the red dotted line and explained in detail in Confidential Bulletin 37-7) was in the upward swing (A,D,F); and three, when it was in the downward swing (B,C,E). Those bear markets which occurred in the falling cycle (B,C,E) had a more severe effect on real estate than those which occurred in the rising cycle (A,D,F). No major real estate depression has occurred from 1795 to the present when this idealized curve was swinging up, although limited recessions in recovery have often accompanied the rising swing (see page 728 of the May, 1937, Real Estate Analyst).
- 6. Only in the stock market break accompanying the great depression (E) did the Dow-Jones averages fall by a greater percentage in an equal period than the fall we have experienced in the last eight months.
- 7. Recovery of real estate after the stock market break has been rapid in those periods which occurred when little building was taking place (A,D). Recovery has been slower in those periods when the break occurred after building had gone forward in considerable volume (B.C.E).
  - 8. Aside from the intensity of the break in the market, the (continued on page 829)








### NINETY PERCENT LOANS FOR REAL ESTATE

HE liberalization of the Federal Housing Administration insurance plan to cover ninety instead of eighty per cent loans on residential properties costing less than \$6000 has been recommended to Congress and is being seriously considered. The argument for this liberalization is that a large number of families in the United States cannot afford a twenty per cent down payment and that by changing the requirements to a ten per cent down payment, home ownership will become possible to a larger group, with a resulting rise in construction and a fall in unemployment. As many people feel that recovery from the present recession depends largely on the construction industry, this ninety per cent plan is certain to find considerable backing.


The five charts on this and the following pages constitute an effort made by Real Estate Analysts, Inc., to examine carefully, without prejudice, the various possibilities in the lending field and the relative safety in various plans for both the mortgagee and the home owner. The conclusions suggested by these charts are not the conclusions of Real Estate Analysts, Inc., but are the conclusions of the facts themselves.

In the charts which accompany this article we are assuming that any policy now proposed should be tested by applying it to the period in which the largest number of loans was made and the greatest amount of building done in the moderate price field. In other words, what would have happened to loans made in 1925 on the basis now proposed?

Of course, it will be argued that using the period from 1925 to 1937 places an unusually severe test on the proposed policies as this period contained the most severe real estate collapse experienced in the past fifty years. While this is true, a stabilized economy is still a theory in grave danger of being disproven by the present recession. It seems to us that collapses similar to the one we have come through in the last few years are still possible in the future.




The chart to left shows the way a property would have come through if financed in on the present eighty per cent, twentyyear amortized loan, insured by the FHA. building, which on the average in 1937 would have cost \$6000, would have cost \$6670 in 1925. The variation in the replacement cost of this property is shown year by year by the top line on the chart. This line includes all items of cost, such as labor, materials, overhead, permits, ground and the



profits of the subcontractor and contractor. The dashed line, starting at the same point in 1925, represents the market value of this property year by year. bottom line on the chart the 'original shows amount of the loan at eighty per cent of the value of the property and the way the principal amount declines over the twenty-year period as monthly payments of slightly less than \$40 are made for principal, interest, insurance and servicing charge. gray shaded area on this

chart represents the equity above the mortgage at any time during the past twelve years, and the red shaded area represents the period in which the market value of the property was less than the amount owed. It will be noticed that in 1931 the value of the property had declined until it was just equal to the amount still owed on the loan, after payments of slightly less than \$40 per month had been made for six years. In 1932 and 1933 the property was worth less than the amount still owed. The recovery in real estate values which started in 1934 restored a slight equity which has been growing each year since due to the increase in real estate values and to the more rapid decrease in the amount still owed.






Chart II shows the same picture, revised for a ninety per cent loan. The replacement cost new on this chart is the same as on Chart I, as is the market value of the property. The loan, however, is now \$6000, with payments of approximately \$45 per month for interest, principal, service charge and insurance. A ninety per cent loan would have been in trouble as early as 1930, as at that time the value of the property would have been less than the amount still owed on the loan. This discrepancy would have increased in 1931, 1932, and 1933; and in 1934, after monthly payments had been made on the principal and interest for a period of nine years, the property would have been worth only as much as the amount still outstanding on the principal of the loan. In 1932 and 1933 it would have been possible to have built a new building for less than the amount still owed on the property, which at this time was eight or nine years old.




Chart III shows examination of another suggestion which been made--loans amortized over a thirty-year instead of a twenty-year It will be noperiod. ticed that on this chart the loan gets into difficulty after just two years of life and that in 1928, 1929,1930,1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and 1936 the property would have been worth less than the amount still owed on the principal; and in 1930,1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934 a as new property could have been built for less than

the amount still owed on the old property.

Chart IV considers the possibility of liberalizing the FHA plan by keeping the present eighty per cent loan, but amortizing over thirty years instead of twenty years. It can be seen quite quickly that any thirty-year amortization plan, unless the loan is fifty per cent or less, will get into trouble sooner or later in a fluctuating market, as values may drop far faster than the principal is reduced by monthly payments. Chart V shows a seventy-five per cent loan amortized in twenty years; and it appears that this loan, regardless of rising or falling markets, is a safe loan at practically all times.


These charts suggest to us that over a period of years a ninety per cent loan is not safe and that a period of amortization on a high percentage loan should not exceed twenty years. We know that it will be said that a twenty or twenty-five per cent down payment is impossible in a large percentage of cases and will prevent home ownership. This we will not deny, but we would ask in return whether home ownership on an insufficient margin with the probable total loss of all payments made would be conducive to the best interests of the home owner or the mortgage lender. True, it might stimulate a volume of new building for awhile; and if adopted as a temporary policy for the next two years only, we believe that it would not do any great damage. However, policies of this sort tend to become permanent. We realize that in Europe, where communities are matured and where fluctuations are less erratic and wild than they are in a newer country, loans for a larger percentage and for a longer number of years can be made.


(continued from page 822) present break is occurring when real estate and building conditions resemble most the conditions which existed in 1901-1903 and in 1919-1921 (A,D).

### Conclusion

The stock market may have lost some of its barometric significance due to "control", which has caused a thin market very liable to take extreme swings. However, the intensity of the break leads us to believe that in many respects the period immediately ahead may be similar to 1920 and 1921 (D).


We are inclined to believe that the trend of business will be down for some time longer; that prices will drop, but not in any such fashion as the drop of 1920 and 1921; that new building will pause in its rise for awhile; and that residential vacancies will increase slightly, halting for a time the rapid rise in residential rents which has been taking place in the last two years. Real estate sales will fall off slightly, but we expect foreclosures to continue an irregular course downward. If the market does not recede still further, we believe that by next summer real estate will again be heading toward the boom, the peak of which we believe probable sometime in the middle forties.





HE chart the left shows the monthly fluctuations in the foreclosure rate in cities having more than 100,000 population. This chart is corrected for seasonal fluctuation and is based on the compilations made by the HOLC. The dashed line on this chart shows the straight line trend, or the rate at which foreclosures have been declining. If this rate continues, foreclosures will be back to the

1926 level by the spring of 1940. In 1926 foreclosures were practically negligible, as we were just passing the top of the last real estate boom at that time.



THE chart above shows the average fluctuations in the bid prices of office and hotel building bonds. The buildings used are only those on which quotations can be secured monthly. The office building list includes the following: Broadway Motors, Bryant Park, Bush Terminal, Carbide and Carbon, Chesebrough, Chrysler, Cleveland Terminal, Equitable (N. Y.), Graybar, Grant, Liggett, One LaSalle Street, Postum, Textile, Wanamaker (Phila.), Woodbridge. The hotel list is composed of issues of the following: Bowman-Biltmore, Eastern Ambassador Hotel, Eppley Hotels, George Washington Hotels, Hotel Lexington, Hotel Sherman, Hotel St. George, La Salle Hotel, Lord Baltimore, National Hotel of Cuba, Palace Hotel, San Francisco, Park Central Hotel, Pitts Hotel, Savoy-Plaza, Sevilla-Biltmore, Sherry-Netherland, Stevens Hotel, Waldorf-Astoria.